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Abstract 
Recent asset pricing models of limits to arbitrage emphasize the role of funding 
conditions faced by financial intermediaries. In the US, the repo market is the key 
funding market. Then, the premium of on-the-run U.S. Treasury bonds should share a 
common component with risk premia in other markets. This observation leads to the 
following identification strategy. We measure the value of funding liquidity from the 
cross-section of on-the-run premia by adding a liquidity factor to an arbitrage-free term 
structure model. As predicted, we find that funding liquidity explains the cross-section of 
risk premia. An increase in the value of liquidity predicts lower risk premia for on-the-
run and off-the-run bonds but higher risk premia on LIBOR loans, swap contracts and 
corporate bonds. Moreover, the impact is large and pervasive through crisis and normal 
times. We check the interpretation of the liquidity factor. It varies with transaction costs, 
S&P500 valuation ratios and aggregate uncertainty. More importantly, the liquidity factor 
varies with narrow measures of monetary aggregates and measures of bank reserves. 
Overall, the results suggest that different securities serve, in part, and to varying degrees, 
to fulfill investors’ uncertain future needs for cash depending on the ability of 
intermediaries to provide immediacy. 
JEL classification: E43, H12  
Bank classification: Financial markets; Financial stability  
Résumé 
Les récents modèles d’évaluation des actifs en contexte d’arbitrage limité font ressortir le 
rôle des conditions de financement auxquelles sont confrontés les intermédiaires 
financiers. Le principal marché de financement aux États-Unis étant celui des pensions, 
les primes sur les obligations du Trésor américain de l’émission courante devraient 
présenter un élément commun avec les primes de risque sur les autres marchés. Cette 
observation amène les auteurs à adopter la stratégie d’identification suivante. À partir 
d’un échantillon de primes sur les obligations des émissions courantes, ils mesurent la 
valeur de la liquidité de financement en ajoutant un facteur de liquidité à un modèle de 
structure des taux d’intérêt sans possibilités d’arbitrage. Comme prévu par les modèles 
d’arbitrage limité, ils constatent que l’évolution des primes de risque s’explique par la 
liquidité de financement. Une augmentation de la valeur de la liquidité annonce une 
baisse des primes de risque sur les obligations de l’émission courante et celles des 
émissions antérieures, mais une hausse des primes de risque sur les prêts LIBOR, les 
contrats de swap et les obligations de sociétés. De plus, cet effet est marqué et se 
manifeste à la fois en temps normal et en temps de crise. Les auteurs vérifient 
l’interprétation du facteur de liquidité. Celui-ci varie en fonction des coûts de transaction, 
des ratios d’évaluation relatifs à l’indice S&P 500, de l’incertitude globale et, ce qui est 
plus important, des agrégats monétaires au sens étroit et des réserves bancaires. 
Globalement, les résultats suggèrent que divers titres servent, en partie et à des degrés   iv
différents, à répondre aux besoins futurs incertains des investisseurs en matière de fonds 
selon la capacité des intermédiaires à assurer l’immédiateté. 
Classification JEL : E43, H12  
Classification de la Banque : Marchés financiers; Stabilité financière  
 
 \... a part of the interest paid, at least on long-term securities, is to be attributed to
uncertainty of the future course of interest rates."
(p.163)
\... the imperfect 'moneyness' of those bills which are not money [...] causes the trouble
of investing in them and [causes them] to stand at a discount."
(p.166)
\... In practice, there is no rate so short that it may not be a®ected by speculative
elements; there is no rate so long that it may not be a®ected by the alternative use of
funds in holding cash."
(p.166)
John R. Hicks, Value and Capital, 2nd edition, 1948.
Introduction
Bond traders know very well that liquidity a®ects asset prices. One prominent case is the on-the-
run premium, whereby the most recently issued (on-the-run) bonds sell at a premium relative to
seasoned (o®-the-run) bonds with similar coupons and maturities. Moreover, systematic variations
in liquidity sometimes drive interest rates across several markets. A case in point occurred around
the Federal Open Market Committee [FOMC] decision, on October 15, 1998, to lower the Federal
Reserve funds rate by 25 basis points. In the meeting's opening, Vice-Chairman McDonough, of
the New York district bank, noted increases in the spread between the on-the-run and the most
recent o®-the-run 30-year Treasury bonds (0.05% to 0.27%), the spreads between the rate on the
¯xed leg of swaps and Treasury notes with two years and ten years to maturity (0.35% to 0.70%,
and 0.50% to 0.95%, respectively), the spreads between Treasuries and investment-grade corporate
securities (0.75% to 1.24%), and ¯nally between Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities (1.10%
to 1.70%). He concluded that we were seeing a run to quality and a serious drying up of liquidity1.
These events attest to the sometimes dramatic impact of liquidity seizures2.
A common explanation for that and the more recent market turmoil is based on a common
wealth shock to capital-constrained intermediaries or speculators (Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Kyle
and Xiong (2001), Gromb and Vayanos (2002)). Intuitively, lower wealth hinders the ability to
pursue quasi-arbitrage opportunities across markets. In practice, the repo market is the key mar-
ket where investment banks, hedge funds and other speculators obtain the marginal funds for their
1Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, October 15, 1998 conference call.
See http://www.federalreserve.gov/Fomc/transcripts/1998/981015confcall.pdf.
2The liquidity crisis of 2007-2008 provides another example. Facing sharp increases of interest rate spreads in most
markets, the Board approved reduction in discount rate, target Federal Funds rate as well as novel policy instruments
to deal with the ongoing liquidity crisis.
1activities and manage their leveraged exposure to risk (Adrian and Shin (2008)). Then, the risk
premia for each market intermediated by a common set of intermediaries share a component mea-
suring tightness in the funding market (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), Krishnamurthy and
He (2008)). This paper tests the implication that tightness of funding conditions in repo markets
should be re°ected in risk premia across ¯nancial markets.
We introduce liquidity as an additional factor in an otherwise standard term structure model.
Indeed, the modern term structure literature has not recognized the importance of aggregate liquid-
ity for government yields. We extend the no-arbitrage dynamic term structure model of Christensen
et al. (2007) [CDR, hereafter] allowing for liquidity3 and we extract a common factor driving on-
the-run premia across maturities. Identi¯cation of the liquidity factor is obtained by estimating
the model from a panel of pairs of U.S. Treasury securities where each pair has similar cash °ows
but di®erent ages. This sidesteps credit risk issues and delivers direct estimates of funding liquidity
value: it isolates price di®erences that can be attributed to liquidity. A recent empirical literature
suggests that liquidity is priced on bond markets4 but these empirical investigations are limited to
a single market. Moreover, none consider the role of funding constraints.
Our main contribution is precisely to show that funding liquidity is an aggregate risk factor that
drives a substantial share of risk premia across interest rate markets. In particular, we document
large variations in the liquidity premium of U.S. Treasury bonds. By construction, an increase in
the liquidity factor is associated with lower expected returns for on-the-run bonds. What we show is
that the risk premium of any U.S. Treasury bonds also decreases substantially. On the other hand,
tight funding conditions raise the risk premium implicit in LIBOR rates, swap rates and corporate
bond yields. This pattern is consistent with accounts of °ight-to-quality but the relationship is
pervasive even in normal times. This adds considerably to the existing evidence pointing toward
the importance of funding liquidity as an aggregate risk factor. Moreover, it suggests that di®erent
securities serve, in part and to varying degrees, to ful¯ll investors uncertain future needs for cash.
We estimate the model and obtain a measure of funding liquidity value from a sample of end-of-
month bond prices running from December 1985 until the end of 2007. Hence, our results cannot
be attributed to the extreme in°uence of 2008. In a concluding section, we repeat the estimation
including 2008 and ¯nd, not unexpectedly, that importance of funding liquidity increases. Our
empirical ¯ndings can be summarized as follows. Panel (a) of Figure 1 presents the measure of
funding liquidity value. Clearly, it exhibits signi¯cant variations through normal and crisis periods.
In particular, the stock crash of 1987, the Mexican Peso devaluation of December 1994, the LTCM
failure of 1998 and the recent liquidity crisis are associated with peaks in investors' valuation of
the funding liquidity of on-the-run bonds. The relationship with the risk premium of government
3This model captures parsimoniously the usual level, slope and curvature factors, while delivering good in-sample
¯t and forecasting power. Moreover, the smooth shape of Nelson-Siegel curves identi¯es small deviations, relative to
an idealized curve, which may be caused by variations in market liquidity.
4See Longsta® (2000) for evidence that liquidity is priced for short-term U.S. Treasury security and Longsta®
(2004) for U.S. Treasury bonds of longer maturities. See Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Longsta® et al. (2005),
Ericsson and Renault (2006), Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam (2006) for corporate bonds.
2bonds is illustrated in Figure 2. Panel (a) compares the funding liquidity factor with annual excess
returns on a 2-year to maturity o®-the-run bond. Clearly, an increase in the value of liquidity
predicts lower expected excess returns and, thus, higher current bond prices. For that maturity, a
one-standard deviation shock to liquidity predicts a decrease in excess returns of 85 basis points
[bps] compared to an average excess returns of 69 bps. We obtain similar results using di®erent
maturities or investment horizons. Intuitively, while an o®-the-run bond may be less liquid relative
to an on-the-run bond with similar characteristics, it is still viewed as a liquid substitute. In
particular, it can still be quickly converted into cash, at low costs, via the funding market.
Next, we consider the predictive power of funding liquidity for the risk premium on short-
term Eurodollar loans. Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows that variations of LIBOR excess returns are
positively linked to variations of funding liquidity. The relationship is signi¯cant, both statistically
and economically. Consider excess returns from borrowing at the risk-free rate for 12 months
and rolling a 3-month LIBOR loans. On average, returns from this strategy are not statistically
di®erent than zero since the higher term premium on the borrowing leg compensates for the 3-
month LIBOR spread earned on the lending leg. However, following a one-standard deviation
shock to the funding liquidity factor, rolling excess returns increase by 42 bps. We reach similar
conclusions using LIBOR spreads as ex-ante measures of risk premium. The e®ect of funding
liquidity also extends to swap markets. Panel (d) compares the liquidity factor with the spread,
above the par Treasury yield, of a swap contract with 5 years to maturity. We ¯nd that a shock
to funding liquidity predicts an increase of 6 bps the 5-year swap spread. This is economically
signi¯cant given the higher sensitivity (i.e. duration) of this contract value to changes in yields. In
each regression, we control for variations in the level and shape of the term structure of Treasury
yields. The marginal contribution of liquidity to the predictive power is high.
Finally, we consider a sample of corporate bond spreads from the NAIC. We ¯nd that the
impact of liquidity is signi¯cant and follows a °ight-to-quality pattern across ratings. For bonds of
the highest credit quality, spreads decrease, on average, following a shock to the funding liquidity
factor. In contrast, spreads of bonds with lower ratings increase. We also compute excess returns
on AAA, AA, A, BBB and High Yield Merrill Lynch corporate bond indices (see Figure 3) and
reach similar conclusions. Bonds with high credit ratings were perceived to be liquid substitutes
to government securities and o®ered lower risk premium following increases of the liquidity factor.
This corresponds to an average e®ect through our sample, the recent events suggests that this is
not always the case.
These results raise the all important issue of identifying macroeconomic drivers of the liquidity
factor. Can we characterize the aggregate liquidity premium in terms of economic state variables?
First, consistent with theory, our liquidity factor varies with measures of transaction costs on the
bond market. Second, we ¯nd that funding liquidity is linked to stock market valuation ratios
and option-implied volatility from S&P 500 index options. These results support empirically the
link between conditions on the funding market, the ability of intermediaries to provide liquidity
and the level and risk of aggregate wealth. Most importantly, we ¯nd that measures of changes in
3monetary aggregates and changes in bank reserves are key determinants of our liquidity measure.
These ¯ndings support our interpretation of the liquidity factor as a measure of conditions on the
funding market. This provides a third important empirical contribution.
Related Literature
A few empirical papers document the e®ects of intermediation constraints in speci¯c markets5
but we di®er in signi¯cant ways from existing work. First, we measure the e®ect of intermediation
constraints directly from observed prices rather than quantities. Prices aggregate information about
and anticipations of intermediaries wealth, their portfolios and the margins they face. Second, we
study a cross-section of money-market and ¯xed-income securities, providing evidence that funding
constraints should be thought as an aggregate risk factor driving liquidity premia across markets.
We introduce a measure of funding liquidity value based on the higher valuation of on-the-run
bonds relative to o®-the-run bonds .6 The on-the-run liquidity premium was ¯rst documented by
Warga (1992). Amihud and Mendelson (1991) and, more recently, Goldreich et al. (2005) con¯rm
the link between the premium and expected transaction costs. Du±e (1996) provides a theoretical
channel between on-the-run premia and lower ¯nancing costs on the repo market. Vayanos and
Weill (2006) extend this view and model search frictions in both the repo and the cash markets
explicitly.7 The key frictions di®erentiating bonds with identical cash °ows lies in their segmented
funding markets. The link between the repo market and the on-the-run premium has been con¯rmed
empirically. (See Jordan and Jordan (1997), Krishnamurthy (2002), Buraschi and Menini (2002)
and Cheria et al. (2004).)
We di®er from the modern term structure literature in two signi¯cant ways. First, the latter
focuses almost exclusively on bootstrapped zero-coupon yields8. This approach is convenient be-
cause a large family of models delivers zero-coupon yields which are linear in the state variables
(see Dai and Singleton (2000)). However, we argue that pre-processing the data wipes out the most
accessible evidence on liquidity, that is the on-the-run premium. Therefore, we use coupon bond
prices directly. However, the state space is no longer linear and we handle non-linearities with
the Unscented Kalman Filter [UKF], an extension of the Kalman Filter for non-linear state-space
systems (Julier et al. (1995) and Julier and Uhlmann (1996)). We ¯rst estimate a model without
liquidity and, notwithstanding di®erences in data and ¯ltering methodologies, our results are con-
sistent with CDR. However, pricing errors in this standard term structure model reveals systematic
5See Froot and O'Connell (2008) for catastrophe insurance, Gabaix et al. (2009) for mortgage-backed securities,
G^ arleanu et al. (2009) for index options and Adrian et al. (2009) for exchange rates.
6The U.S Treasury recognizes and takes advantages of this price di®erential: \In addition, although it is not a
primary reason for conducting buy-backs, we may be able to reduce the government's interest expense by purchasing
older, \o®-the-run" debt and replacing it with lower-yield \on-the-run" debt." [Treasury Assistant Secretary for
¯nancial markets Lewis A. Sachs, Testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means].
7Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) introduced search frictions in monetary theory and Shi (2005) extends this framework
to include bonds. See Shi (2006) for a review. Search frictions can also rationalize the spreads between bid and ask
prices o®ered by market intermediaries (Du±e et al. (2005)).
8The CRSP data set of zero-coupon yields is the most commonly used. It is based on the bootstrap method of
Fama and Bliss (1987) [FB].
4di®erences within pairs, correlated with ages. Estimation of the model with liquidity produces a
persistent factor capturing di®erences between prices of recently issued bonds and prices of older
bonds. The on-the-run premium increases with maturity but decays with the age of a bond. These
new features complete our contributions to the modeling of the term structure of interest rates in
presence of a liquidity factor.
We also di®er from the recent literature using a reduced-form approach that model a convenience
yield in interest rate markets (Du±e and Singleton (1997)). A one-factor model of the convenience
yield cannot match the pattern of on-the-run premia across maturities. Moreover, the link between
the premium and the age of a bond cannot be captured in a frictionless arbitrage-free model. Still,
Grinblatt (2001) argues that the convenience yields of U.S. Treasury bills can explain the U.S. Dollar
swap spread. Recently, Liu et al. (2006) and FedlhÄ utter and Lando (2007) evaluate the relative
importance of credit and liquidity risks in swap spreads. Other empirical investigations are related
to our work. Jump risk (Tauchen and Zhou (2006)) or the debt-gdp ratio (Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2007)) have been proposed to explain the non-default component of corporate
spreads. Finally, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Amihud (2002) provide evidence of a liquidity
risk factor in expected stock returns.
The link between interest rates and aggregate liquidity is supported elsewhere in the theoretical
literature. Svensson (1985) uses a cash-in-advance constraint in a monetary economy. Bansal and
Coleman (1996) allow government bonds to back checkable accounts and reduced transaction costs
in a monetary economy. Luttmer (1996) investigates asset pricing in economies with frictions and
shows that with transaction costs (bid-ask spreads) there is in general little evidence against the
consumption-based power utility model with low risk-aversion parameters. HolmstrÄ om and Tirole
(1998) introduce a link between the liquidity demand of ¯nancially constrained ¯rms and asset
prices. Acharya and Pedersen (2004) propose a liquidity-adjusted CAPM model where transaction
costs are time-varying. Alternatively, Vayanos (2004) takes transactions costs as ¯xed but intro-
duces the risk of having to liquidate a portfolio. Lagos (2006) extends the search friction argument
to multiple assets: in a decentralized exchange, agents with uncertain future hedging demand prefer
assets with lower search costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model and its
state-space representation. Section II describes the data and Section III introduces the estimation
method based on the UKF. We report estimation results for models with and without liquidity in
Section IV. Section V evaluates the information content of liquidity for excess returns and interest
rate spreads while Section VI identi¯es economic determinants of liquidity. Section VIII concludes.
I A Term Structure Model With Liquidity
We base our model on the Arbitrage-Free Extended Nelson-Siegel [AFENS] model introduced in
CDR. This model belongs to the a±ne family (Du±e and Kan (1996)). The latent state variables
relevant for the evolution of interest rates are grouped within a vector Ft of dimension k = 3. Its
5dynamics under the risk-neutral measure Q is described by the stochastic di®erential equation
dF
Q
t = KQ(µQ ¡ Ft) + §dW
Q
t ; (1)
where dWt is a standard Brownian motion process. Combined with the assumption that the short
rate is a±ne in all three factors, the model then leads to the usual a±ne solution for discount bond
yields.
In this context, CDR show that if the short rate is de¯ned as rt = F1;t + F2;t and if the











then the absence of arbitrage opportunity implies the discount yield function,
y(Ft;m) = a(m) + F1;tb1(m) + F2;tb2(m) + F3;tb3(m); (3)















where m ¸ 0 is the length of time until maturity (see Appendix C for the a(m) term).
These loadings are consistent with the static Nelson-Siegel representation of forward rates (Nel-
son and Siegel (1987), NS hereafter). Their shapes across maturities lead to the usual interpretations
of factors in terms of level, slope and curvature. Moreover, the NS representation is parsimonious
and imposes a smooth shape to the forward rate curve. Empirically, this approach is robust to
over-¯tting and delivers performance in line with, or better than, other methods for pricing out-of-
sample bonds in the cross-section of maturities9. Conversely, its smooth shape is useful to identify
deviations of observed yields from an idealized curve.
A dynamic extension of the NS model, the Extended Nelson-Siegel model [ENS], was ¯rst
proposed by Diebold and Li (2006) and Diebold et al. (2006). Diebold and Li (2006) document
large improvements in long-horizon interest rate forecasting. They argue that the ENS model
performs better than the best essentially a±ne model of Du®ee (2002) and point toward the model's
parsimony to explain its successes. A persistent concern, though, was that the ENS model does not
enforce the absence of arbitrage. This is precisely the contribution of CDR. They derive the class of
9See Bliss (1997) and Anderson et al. (1996) for an evaluation of yield curve estimation methods.
6continuous-time arbitrage-free a±ne dynamic term structure models with loadings that correspond
to the NS representation. Intuitively, an AFENS model corresponds to a canonical a±ne model in
Dai and Singleton (2000) where the loading shapes have been restricted through over-identifying
assumptions on the parameters governing the risk-neutral dynamics of latent factors. CDR compare
the ENS and AFENS models and show that implementing these restrictions improves forecasting
performances further.
Interestingly, CDR show that we are free to choose the drift and variance term for the dynamics
under the physical measure
dFP
t = KP(µP ¡ Ft) + §dWP
t ; (5)
and we impose that § is lower triangular and that KP is diagonal10. We can then cast the model
within a discretized state-space representation. The state equation becomes
(Ft ¡ ¹ F) = ©(Ft¡1 ¡ ¹ F) + ¡²t; (6)














Finally, we de¯ne a new latent state variable, Lt, that will be driving the liquidity premium.
Its transition equation is
(Lt ¡ ¹ L) = Ál(Lt¡1 ¡ ¹ L) + ¾l²l
t; (9)
where the innovation ²l
t is standard Gaussian and uncorrelated with ²t.
Typically, term structure models are not estimated from observed prices. Rather, coupon bond
prices are converted to forward rates using the bootstrap method. This is convenient as a±ne term
structure models deliver forward rates that are linear in state variables. Is is also thought to be
innocuous because bootstrapped forward rates achieve near-exact pricing of the original sample
of bonds. Unfortunately, this extreme ¯t means that a naive application of the bootstrap pushes
any liquidity e®ects and other price idiosyncracies into forward rates. Fama and Bliss (1987)
handle this sensitivity to over-¯tting by excluding bonds with \large" price di®erences relative to
their neighbors.11 This approach is certainly justi¯ed for many of the questions addressed in the
10Formally, the assumption on § is required for identi¯cation purposes. In practice, the presence of the o®-diagonal
elements in the K
P matrix does not change our results. Moreover, CDR show that allowing for an unrestricted matrix
K
P deteriorates out-of-sample performance.
11The CRSP data set of zero coupon yields is based on the approach proposed by Fama and Bliss. See also the
7literature, butit removes any evidence of large liquidity e®ects. Moreover, the FB data set focuses
on discount bond prices at annual maturity intervals. This smooths away evidence of small liquidity
e®ects remaining in the data and passed through to forward rates. These e®ects would be apparent
from reversals in the forward rate function at short maturity interval. Consider three quotes for
bonds with successive maturities M1 < M2 < M3. A relatively expensive quote at maturity M2
induces a relatively small forward rate from M1 to M2. However, the following normal quote with
maturity M3 requires a relatively large forward rate from M2 to M3. This is needed to compensate
the previous low rate and to achieve exact pricing as required by the bootstrap. However, the
reversal cancels itself as we sum intra-period forward rates to compute annual rates.
Instead of using smoothed data, we proceed from observed coupon bonds with maturity, say,
M and with coupons at maturities m = m1;:::;M. The price, Dt(m), of a discount bond with






which follows directly from equation (3) but where we use vector notation for factors Ft and factor
loadings b(m). In a frictionless economy, the absence of arbitrage implies that the price of a coupon




Dt(m) £ Ct(m); (10)
where Zt includes (deterministic) characteristics relevant for pricing a bond. In this case, it includes
the maturity M and the schedule of future coupons and principal payments, Ct(m).
However, with a short-sale constraint on government bonds and a collateral constraint in the
repo market, Luttmer (1996) shows that the set of stochastic discount factors consistent with the
absence of arbitrage satis¯es P ¸ P¤. These constraints match the institutional features of the
Treasury market. An investor cannot issue new bonds to establish a short position. Instead, she
must borrow the bond on the repo market through a collateralized loan. Then, we model the price,
P(Ft;Lt;Zt), of a coupon bond with characteristics Zt as the sum of discounted coupons to which




Dt(m) £ Cn;t(m) + ³(Lt;Zn;t):
CRSP documentation for a description of this procedure. Brie°y, a ¯rst ¯lter includes a quote if its yield to maturity
falls within a range of 20 basis points from one of the moving averages on the 3 longer or the 3 shorter maturity
instruments or if its yield to maturity falls between the two moving averages. When computing averages, precedence
is given to bills when available and this is explicitly designed to exclude the impact of liquidity on notes and bonds
with maturity of less than one year. Amihud and Mendelson (1991) document that yield di®erences between notes
and adjacent bills is 43 basis point on average, a ¯gure much larger than the 20 basis point cuto®. The second ¯lter
excludes observations that cause reversals of 20 basis points in the bootstrapped discount yield function. The impact
of these ¯lters has not been studied in the literature.
8Here Zt also includes the age of the bond. Note that the liquidity term should be positive to be
consistent with a Luttmer (1996).
That the on-the-run premium is related to the short-sale constraint on government bonds and
the collateral constraint in the repo market is justi¯ed by the results of Vayanos and Weill (2006) (see
also Du±e (1996)). They show that the combination of these constraints with search frictions on the
repo market induces di®erences in funding costs that favor recently issued bonds. Intuitively, the
repo market provides the required heterogeneity between assets with identical payo®s. An investor
cannot choose which bond to deliver to unwind a repo position; she must ¯nd and deliver the same
security she had originally borrowed. Because of search frictions, then, investors are better o® in
the aggregate if they coordinate around one security to reduce search costs. In practice, the repo
rate is lower for this special issue to provide an incentive for bond holders to bring their bonds to
the repo market. Typically, recently issued bonds bene¯t from these lower ¯nancing costs, leading
to the on-the-run premium. Moreover, these bonds o®er lower transaction costs adding to the
wedge between asset prices (Amihud and Mendelson (1986)). Empirically, both channels seem to
be at work although the e®ect of lower transaction costs appears weaker than the e®ect of lower
funding rates.12
Grouping observations together, and adding an error term, we obtain our measurement equation
P(Ft;Lt;Zt) = CtDt + ³(Lt;Zt) + ­ºt; (11)
where Ct is the (N £Mmax) payo®s matrix obtained from stacking the N row vectors of individual
bond payo®s and Mmax is the longest maturity group in the sample. Shorter payo® vectors are
completed with zeros. Similarly, ³(Lt;Zt) is a N £ 1 vector obtained by staking the individual
liquidity premium. Dt is a (Mmax £ 1) vector of discount bond prices and the measurement error,
ºt, is a (N £ 1) gaussian white noise uncorrelated with innovations in state variables. The matrix
­ is assumed diagonal and its elements are a linear function of maturity,
!n = !0 + !1Mn;
which reduce substantially the dimension of the estimation problem. However, leaving the diagonal
elements of ­ unrestricted does not a®ect our results13.
Our speci¯cation of the liquidity premium is based on a latent factor common to all bonds but
with loadings that vary with maturity and age. The premium is given by








12Amihud and Mendelson (1991) and Goldreich et al. (2005) consider transaction costs. Jordan and Jordan (1997),
Krishnamurthy (2002) and Cheria et al. (2004) consider funding costs. See also, Buraschi and Menini (2002) for the
German bonds market.
13This may be due to the fact that the level factor explains most of yields variability. Its impact on bond prices is
linear in duration and duration is approximately linear in maturity, at least for maturities up to 10 years. Bid-ask
spreads increase with maturity and may also contribute to an increase in measurement errors with maturity.
9where aget is the age, in years, of the bond at time t. The parameter ¯M controls the average
on-the-run premium at each ¯xed maturity M. Warga (1992) document the impact of age and
maturity on the average premium. We estimate ¯ for a ¯xed set of maturities and the shape of ¯ is
unrestricted between these maturities.14 Next, the parameter · controls the on-the-run premium's
decay with age. The gradual decay of the premium with age has been documented by Goldreich
et al. (2005). For instance, immediately following its issuance (i.e.: age = 0), the loading on the
liquidity factor is ¯M £ 1. Taking · = 0:5, the loading decreases by half within any maturity
group after a little more than 4 months following issuance : ³(Lt;4) ¼ 1
2³(Lt;0)). While the
speci¯cation above re°ects our priors about the impact of age and maturity, the scale parameters
are left unrestricted at estimation and we allow for a continuum of shapes for the decay of liquidity.
However, we ¯x ¯10 = 1 to identify the level of the liquidity factor with the average premium of a
just-issued 10-year bond relative to a very old bond with the same maturity and coupons.
Equation (11) shows that omitting the liquidity term will push the impact of liquidity into
pricing errors, possibly leading to biased estimators and large ¯ltering errors. Alternatively, adding
a liquidity term amounts to ¯ltering a latent factor present in pricing errors. However, Equation (11)
shows that this factor captures that part of pricing errors correlated with bond ages. Our maintained
hypothesis is that any such positive factor can be interpreted as a liquidity e®ect. Clearly, the
impact of age on the price of a bond can hardly be rationalized in a frictionless economy.
Intuitively, our speci¯cation delivers a discount rate function consistent with o®-the-run valua-
tion but remains silent on the linkage with the equilibrium stochastic discount factor. A structural
speci¯cation of the liquidity premium raises important challenges. The on-the-run premium is a
real arbitrage opportunity unless we explicitly consider the costs of shorting the more expensive
bond or, alternatively, the bene¯ts accruing to the bondholder from a lower repo rate. These
features are absent from the current crop of term structure models with the notable exception of
Cheria et al. (2004) who allow for a convenience yield, due to lower repo rates accruing to holders of
an on-the-run issue. Clearly, theory suggests that using repo rates may improve the identi¯cation
of the premium. Unfortunately, this would restrict our analysis to a much shorter sample where
repo data are readily available. In any case, a joint model of the term structure of repo rates and
of government yields may still not be free of arbitrage unless we also model the convenience yield
of holding short-term government securities. This follows from the observation that a Treasury
bill typically o®ers a lower yield than a repo contract with the same maturity. Moreover, the
stochastic properties of repo rates are not well known, as well as the form of their relationships
with bond yields. This is beyond the scope of this paper. Our strategy bypasses these challenging
considerations but still uncovers the key role funding liquidity. We now turn to a description of the
data.
14Opportunities of arbitrage may arise if ¯ follows a step process across maturities. We thank an anonymous referee
for this remark.
10II Data
We use end-of-month prices of U.S. Treasury securities from the CRSP data set. Our sample
covers the period from January 1986 to December 2008. However, we estimate the model both
with and without 2008 data. Before 1986, interest income had a favorable tax treatment compared
to capital gains and investors favored high-coupon bonds. The resulting tax premium and the
on-the-run premium cannot be disentangled in the earlier period. When interest rates are rising,
recently issued bonds had relatively high coupons and were priced at a premium both for their
liquidity and for their tax bene¯ts. Green and Âdegaard (1997) document that the high-coupon
tax premium mostly disappeared when the asymmetric treatment of interest income and capital
gains was eliminated following the 1986 tax reform.
The CRSP data set15 provides quotes on all outstanding U.S. Treasury securities. We ¯lter
unreliable observations and construct bins around maturities of 3, 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 60,
84 and 120 months.16 Then, at each date, and for each bin, we choose a pair of securities to
identify the on-the-run premium. First, we want to pick the on-the-run security if any is available.
Unfortunately, on-the-run bonds are not directly identi¯ed in the CRSP database. Instead, we
use time since issuance as a proxy and pick the most recently issued security in each maturity
bin. Second, we choose the security that most closely matches the bin's maturity (e.g. 3 months,
6 months,...). Note that pinning o®-the-run securities at ¯xed maturities ensures a stable coverage
of the term structure of interest rates. Also, by construction, securities within each pair have the
same credit quality and very close times to maturity. We do not match coupon rates but coupon
di®erences within pairs are low in practice.
The most important aspect of our sample is that whenever a security trades at premium relative
to its pair companion, any large price di®erence cannot be rationalized from small coupon or ma-
turity di®erences under the no-arbitrage restriction. On the other hand, price di®erences common
across maturities and correlated with age will be attributed to liquidity. Note that the most recent
issue for a given bin and date is not always an on-the-run security. This may be due to the absence
of new issuance in some maturity bins throughout the whole sample (e.g. 18 months to maturity)
or within some sub-periods (e.g. 84 months to maturity). Alternatively, the on-the-run bond may
be a few months old, due to the quarterly issuance pattern observed in some maturity categories.
In any case, this introduces variability in age di®erences which, in turn, identi¯es how the liquidity
premium varies with age.
We now investigate some features of our sample of 265 £22 = 5830 observations. The ¯rst two
columns of Table I present means and standard deviations of age for each liquidity-maturity cate-
gory. The average o®-the-run security is always older than the corresponding on-the-run security.
Typically, the o®-the-run security has been in circulation for more than a year. In contrast, the
on-the-run security is typically a few months old and only a few weeks old in the 6 and 24-month
15See Elton and Green (1998) and Piazzesi (2005) for discussion of the CRSP data set.
16See Apppendix A for more details on data ¯lter.
11categories. A relatively low average age for the recent issues indicates a regular issuance pattern.
On the other hand, the relatively high standard deviations in the 36 and 84-month categories re°ect
the decision by the U.S. Treasury to stop the issuance cycles at these maturities.
[Table I about here.]
Next, Table I presents means and standard deviations of duration17. Average duration is almost
linear in maturity. As expected, duration is similar within pairs implying that averages of cash
°ow maturities are very close. Finally, the last columns of Table I show that the term structure
of coupons is upward sloping on average and the high standard deviations indicate important
variations across the sample. This is in part due to the general decline of interest rates. Nonetheless,
coupon rate di®erences within pairs are small on average. To summarize our strategy, di®erences
in duration and coupon rates are kept small within each pair but di®erences of ages are highlighted
so that we can identify any e®ect of liquidity on prices that is linked to age.
III Estimation Methodology
Equations (6), (9) and (11) can be summarized as a state-space system
(Xt ¡ ¹ X) = ©X(Xt¡1 ¡ ¹ X) + §X²t
Pt = ª(Xt;Ct;Zt) + ­ºt; (13)
where Xt ´ [FT
t Lt]T and ª is the (non-linear) mapping of cash °ows Ct, bond characteristics, Zt,
and current states, Xt, into prices, Pt.
Estimation of this system is challenging because we do not know the joint density of factors and
prices. Various strategies to deal with non-linear state-space systems have been proposed in the
¯ltering literature: the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF), the Particle Filter (PF) and more recently
the Unscented Kalman Filter18 (UKF). The UKF is based on a method for calculating statistics
of a random variable which undergoes a nonlinear transformation. It starts with a well-chosen set
of points with given sample mean and covariance. The nonlinear function is then applied to each
point and moments are computed from transformed points. This approach has a Monte Carlo °avor
but the sample is drawn according to a speci¯c deterministic algorithm. It delivers second-order
accuracy with no increase in computing costs relative to the EKF. Moreover, analytical derivatives
are not required. The UKF has been introduced in the term structure literature by Leippold and
Wu (2003) and in the foreign exchange literature by Bakshi et al. (2005). Recently, Christo®ersen
et al. (2007) compared the EKF and the UKF for the estimation of term structure models. They
conclude that the UKF improves ¯ltering results and substantially reduces estimation bias.
17Duration is the relevant measure to compare maturities of bonds with di®erent coupons.
18See Julier et al. (1995), Julier and Uhlmann (1996) and Wan and der Merwe (2001) for a textbook treatment.
Another popular approach bypasses ¯ltering altogether. It assumes that some prices are observed without errors and
obtains factors by inverting the pricing equation. In our context, the choice of maturities and liquidity types that
are not a®ected by measurement errors is not innocuous and impacts estimates of the liquidity factor.
12To set up notation, we state the standard Kalman ¯lter algorithm as applied to our model. We
then explain how the unscented approximation helps overcome the challenge posed by a non-linear
state-space system. First, consider the case where ª is linear in X and where state variables and
bond prices are jointly Gaussian. In this case, the Kalman recursion provides optimal estimates
of current state variables given past and current prices. The recursion works o® estimates of state
variables and their associated MSE from the previous step,
^ Xt+1jt ´ E [Xt+1j=t];
Qt+1jt ´ E
h
( ^ Xt+1jt ¡ Xt+1)( ^ Xt+1jt ¡ Xt+1)T
i
; (14)
where =t belongs to the natural ¯ltration generated by bond prices. The associated predicted bond
prices, and MSE, are given by
^ Pt+1jt ´ E [Pt+1j=t]
= ª( ^ Xt+1jt;Ct+1;Zt+1); (15)
Rt+1jt ´ E
h
( ^ Pt+1jt ¡ Pt+1)( ^ Pt+1jt ¡ Pt+1)T
i
= ª( ^ Xt+1jt;Ct+1;Zt+1)T ^ Qt+1jtª( ^ Xt+1jt;Ct+1;Zt+1) + ­; (16)
using the linearity of ª. The next step compares predicted to observed bond prices and update
state variables and their MSE,
^ Xt+1jt+1 = ^ Xt+1jt + Kt+1(Pt+1 ¡ ^ Pt+1jt); (17)





( ^ Xt+1jt ¡ Xt+1)( ^ Pt+1jt ¡ Pt+1)T
i
;
= Qt+1jtª( ^ Xt+1jt;Ct+1;Zt+1); (19)
measures co-movements between pricing and ¯ltering errors. Finally, the transition equation gives
us a conditional forecast of Xt+2,




The recursion delivers series ^ Ptjt¡1 and Rtjt¡1 for t = 1;¢¢¢ ;T. Treating ^ X1j0 as a parameter, and












where Á(¢;¢) is the multivariate Gaussian density.
However, because ª(¢) is not linear, equations (15) and (16) do not correspond to the conditional
expectation of prices and the associated MSE. Also, (19) does not correspond to the conditional
covariance between pricing and ¯ltering errors. Still, the updating equations (17) and (18) remain
justi¯ed as optimal linear projections. Then, we can recover the Kalman recursion provided we
obtain approximations of the relevant conditional moments. This is precisely what the unscented
transformation achieves, using a small deterministic sample from the conditional distribution of
factors while maintaining a higher order approximation than linearization19. We can then use the
likelihood given in (22), but in a QML context. Using standard results, we have ^ µ ¼ N(µ0;T¡1­)







where ³H and ³OP are the alternative representations of the information matrix, in the Gaussian
case. These can be consistently estimated via their sample counterparts. We have





















Finally, the model implies some restrictions on the parameter space. In particular, Ál and
diagonal elements of © must lie in (¡1;1) while · and ¸ must remain positive. In practice, large
values of · or ¸ lead to numerical di±culties and are excluded. Finally, we maintain the second
covariance contour of state variables inside the parameter space associated with positive interest
rates. The ¯ltering algorithm often fails outside this parameter space. None of these constraints
binds around the optimum and estimates remain unchanged when the constraints are relaxed.
IV Estimation Results
We ¯rst estimate a restricted version of our model, excluding liquidity. Filtered factors and pa-
rameter estimates are consistent with results obtained by CDR from zero-coupon bonds. More
interestingly, the on-the-run premium reveals itself in the residuals from the benchmark model.
This provides a direct justi¯cation for linking the premium with the age and maturity of each
19See Appendix B.
14bond. We then estimate the unrestricted liquidity model. The null of no liquidity is easily rejected
and the liquidity factor captures systematic di®erences between on-the-run and o®-the-run bonds.
Finally, estimates imply that the on-the-run premium increases with maturity but decreases with
the age of a bond.
A Results For The Benchmark Model Without Liquidity
Estimation20 of the benchmark model put the curvature parameter at ^ ¸ = 0:6786 when time
periods are measured in years. The standard error is 0:0305 and 0:0044 when using the QMLE
and MLE covariance matrix, respectively. This estimate pins the maximum curvature loading at a
maturity close to 30 months.
[Table II about here.]
Figure 1 displays the time series of the liquidity (Panel (a)) and the term structure (Panel (b))
factors. Estimates for the transition equation are given in Table IIa. The results imply average
short and long term discount rates of 3.73% and 5.45%, respectively. The level factor is very
persistent, perhaps a unit root. This standard result in part re°ects the gradual decline of interest
rates in our sample. The slope factor is slightly less persistent and exhibits the usual association
with business cycles. Its sign changes before the recessions of 1990 and 2001. The slope of the term
structure is also inverted starting in 2006, during the so-called \conundrum" episode. Finally, the
curvature factor is closely related to the slope factor.
Standard deviations of pricing errors are given by
¾(Mn) = 0:0229 + 0:0284 £ Mn;
(0:017; 0:0012) (0:021; 0:0006)
with QMLE and MLE standard errors for each parameter. This implies standard deviations of
%0.05 and $0.31 dollars for maturities of 1 and 10 years, respectively. Using durations of 1 and
7 years, this translates into yield errors of 5.1 and 4.4 bps. Table IIIa gives more information on
the ¯t of the benchmark model. Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSE) increase from $0.047 and
$0.046 for 3-month on-the-run and o®-the-run securities, respectively, to $0.35 and $0.39 at 10-year
maturity. As discussed above, the monotonous increase of RMSE with maturity re°ects the higher
sensitivity of longer maturity bonds to interest rates. It may also be due to higher uncertainty
surrounding the true prices, as signaled by wider bid-ask spreads. In addition, for most maturities,
the RMSE is larger for on-the-run bonds. For the entire sample, the RMSE is $0.188.
Notwithstanding di®erences between estimation approaches, our results are consistent with
CDR. Estimating using coupon bonds or using bootstrapped data provides similar pictures of the
20Estimation is implemented in MATLAB via the fmincon routine with the medium-scale (active-set) algorithm.
Di®erent starting values were used. For standard errors computations, we obtain the ¯nal Hessian update (BFGS
formula) and each observation gradient is obtained through a centered ¯nite di®erence approximation evaluated at
the optimum.
15underlying term structure of interest rates. Also, the approximation introduced when dealing with
nonlinearities is innocuous. However, preliminary estimation of forward rate curves smooths away
any e®ect of liquidity. In contrast, our sample comprises on-the-run and o®-the-run bonds. Any
systematic price di®erences not due to cash °ow di®erences will be revealed in the pricing errors.
[Table III about here.]
Table IIIa con¯rms that Mean Pricing Errors (MPE) are systematically higher for on-the-
run securities. On-the-run residuals are systematically higher than o®-the-run residuals. For a
recent 12-month T-Bill, the average di®erence is close to $0:08, controlling for cash °ow di®erences.
Similarly, a recently issued 5-year bond is $0:25 more expensive on average than a similar but older
issue.21 To get a clearer picture of the link between age and price di®erences, consider Figure 4.
The top panels plot residual di®erences within the 12-month and 48-month categories. The bottom
panels plot the ages of each bond in these categories. Panel (c) shows that the U.S. Treasury
stopped regular issuance of the 12-month Notes in 2000. The liquidity premium was generally
positive until then but stopped when issuance ceased. Afterwards, each pair is made of old 2-year
Notes, and evidence of a premium disappears from the residuals. Panel (d) shows that there has
been regular issuance of 4-year bonds early in the sample. As expected, the di®erence between
residuals is generally positive whenever there is a signi¯cant age di®erence between the two issues.
Moreover, in each case, on-the-run (i.e. low age) bonds appear overpriced compared to o®-the-run
(i.e. high age) bonds. This correspondence between issuance patterns and systematic pricing errors
can be observed in each maturity category. The premium increases with maturity but decreases
with age.
Bonds with 24 months to maturity seem to carry a smaller liquidity premium than what would
be expected given the regular monthly issuance for this category. Note that a formal test rejects
the null hypothesis of zero-mean residual di®erences. Interestingly, Jordan and Jordan (1997) could
not ¯nd evidence of a liquidity or specialness e®ect at that maturity22. A smaller price premium for
2-year Notes is intriguing and we can only conjecture as to its causes. Recall that the magnitude
of the premium depends on the bene¯ts of higher liquidity, both in terms of lower transaction costs
and lower repo rates. However, it also depends on the expected length of time a bond will o®er
these bene¯ts. Results in Jordan and Jordan (1997) suggests that 2-year Notes remain \special"
for shorter periods of time (see Table I, p.2057). Similarly, Goldreich et al. (2005) ¯nd that the
on-the-run premium on 2-year Notes goes to zero faster than other maturities, on average. This is
consistent with its short issuance cycle. Alternatively, holders of long-term bonds may re-allocate
funds from their now short maturity bonds into newly issued longer term securities. If the two-year
mark serves as a focus point for buyers and sellers, this may cause a larger volume of transactions
around this key maturity, increasing the liquidity value of surrounding assets.
21Note that the price impact of liquidity increases with maturity. This is consistent with the results of Amihud
and Mendelson (1991).
22See Jordan and Jordan (1997) p. 2061: \With the exception of the 2-year notes [...], the average price di®erences
in Table II are noticeably larger when the issue examined is on special."
16B Results For The Liquidity Model
Estimation of the unrestricted model leads to a substantial increase of the log-likelihood. The
benchmark model is nested with 15 parameter restrictions and the improvement in likelihood is
such that the LR test-statistic leads to a p-value that is essentially zero23. The estimate for the
curvature parameter is now ^ ¸ = 0:7304 with QMLE and MLE standard errors of 0:0857 and 0:0043.
Results for the transition equations are given in Table IIb. These imply average short and long
term discount rates of 4.09% and 5.76% respectively. Interestingly, the yield curve level is higher
once we account for the liquidity premium. Intuitively, the o®-the-run yield curve is higher than
an otherwise unadjusted estimate would suggest. The standard deviations of measurement errors
are given by
¾(Mn)2 = 0:0227+ 0:0251 £ Mn;
(0:016;0:001) (0:0021;0:0006)
with QMLE and MLE standard errors for each parameter in parenthesis. Then, standard deviations
are $0.048 and $0.274 for bonds with one and ten years to maturity, respectively. Using durations of
1 and 7, this translates into standard deviations of 4.8 and 3.9 bps when measured in yields. Overall,
parameter estimates and latent factors are relatively unchanged compared to the benchmark model.
We estimate the decay parameter at ^ · = 1:89 with QMLE and MLE standard errors of 1:23
and 0:45 respectively. Estimates of ¯ are given in Table IV. Note that the level of the liquidity
premium increases with maturity.24 The pattern accords with the observations made from residuals
of the model without liquidity. Moreover, Table IIIa shows that the model eliminates most of the
systematic di®erences between on-the-run and o®-the-run bonds. There is still some evidence of a
systematic di®erence in the 10-year category where the average error decreases from $0.31 to $0.26.
We conclude that part of the variations in the 10-year on-the-run premium is not common with
variations in other maturity groups. Finally, Table IIIb shows RMSE improvements for almost all
maturities while the overall sample RMSE decreases from $0.188 to $0.151.
[Table IV about here.]
Figure 5 draw the residual di®erences within the 12-month and 60-month category, respectively.
This is another way to see that the model removes systematic di®erences between residuals. Overall,
the evidence points toward a large common factor driving the liquidity premium of on-the-run U.S.
Treasury securities. We interpret this liquidity factor as a measure of the value of funding liquidity
to investors. The results below show that its variations also explain a substantial share of the risk
premia observed in di®erent interest rate markets.
23The benchmark model reached a maximum at 1998:6 while the liquidity model reached a maximum at 3482:6.
24The estimated average level is lower in the 10-year group relative to the 5-year and 7-year group. This is due to
the lower average age of bonds in this groups.
17V Liquidity And Bond Risk Premia
In this section, we present evidence that variations in the value of funding liquidity, as measured
from a cross-section of on-the-run premia, share a common components with variations of risk
premia in other interest rate markets. In other words, conditions prevailing on the funding market
induce an aggregate risk factor that a®ects each of these markets. Of course, an increase in the
liquidity factor necessarily leads to lower excess returns for on-the-run bonds. We show here that it
also leads to lower risk premia for o®-the-run bonds as well as higher risk premia on LIBOR loans,
swap contracts and corporate bonds. Thus, although the payo®s of these assets are not directly
related to the higher liquidity of on-the-run securities, their risk premium and, hence, their price,
is a®ected by a common liquidity factor. To summarize, exposure to liquidity risk in the U.S.
Treasury funding market carries a substantial price of risk in the cross-section of bond returns.
The impact across assets is similar to the often cited \°ight-to-liquidity" phenomenon but remains
pervasive in normal market conditions. This commonality across liquidity premia accords with a
substantial theoretical literature supporting the existence of an economy-wide liquidity premium
(Svensson (1985), Bansal and Coleman (1996), HolmtrÄ om and Tirole (1998, 2001), Acharya and
Pedersen (2004), Vayanos (2004), Lagos (2006), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), Krishnamurthy
and He (2008).). The following section presents our results.25
A O®-The-Run U.S. Treasury Bonds
We ¯rst document the negative relationship between liquidity and expected excess returns on
o®-the-run bonds. This is the return, over a given investment horizon, from holding a long maturity
bond, in excess of the risk-free rate for that horizon. Figure 3a displays annual excess returns on
a 2-year o®-the-run bond along with the liquidity factor. The negative relationship is visually
apparent throughout the sample but note the sharp variations around the crash of October 1987,
the Mexican Peso crisis late in 1994, around the LTCM crisis in August 1998 and until the end of
the millennium. At ¯rst, this tight link between on-the-run premia and returns from o®-the-run
Treasury bonds may be surprising. Recall that on-the-run bonds trade at a premium due to their
anticipated transaction costs and funding advantages on the cash and repo markets. However,
o®-the-run bonds can be readily converted into cash via the repo market. This is especially true
relative to other asset classes. In that sense, seasoned bonds are close substitutes to on-the-run
bonds. Then, the risk premium of all Treasury bonds decreases in periods of high demand for
the relative funding liquidity of on-the-run bonds. Longsta® (2004) documents price di®erences
25All the results below are robust to choice of the o®-the-run yield curve used to compute excess returns or spreads.
Unless otherwise stated we use o®-the-run yields from the Svensson, Nelson and Siegel method (Gurkaynak et al.
(2006)) available at (http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007). Using model-implied zero-coupon yields does
not a®ect the results. Also, for ease of interpretation, we standardize each regressor by subtracting its mean and
dividing by its standard deviation. For each risk premium regression, the constant corresponds to an estimate of the
average risk premium and the coe±cient on the liquidity factor measures the impact on expected returns, in basis
points, of a one-standard deviation shock to liquidity.
18between o®-the-run U.S Treasury bonds and Refcorp bonds26 with similar cash °ows. He argues
that discounts on Refcorp bond are due to \...the liquidity of Treasury bonds, especially in unsettled
markets.".
[Table V about here.]
We test this hypothesis through predictive regressions of o®-the-run bond excess returns on
the liquidity factor. We use the o®-the-run curve from the model to compute excess returns and
include term structure factors to control for the information content of forward rates (Fama and
Bliss (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1991), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a)). The term structure
factors spans forward rates but do not su®er from their near-collinearity. Table V presents the
results. We consider (annualized) excess returns from holding o®-the-run bonds with maturities
of 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10 years and for investment horizons of 1, 3, 6, 12, and 24 months. First,
Panel (a) presents average risk premia. These range from 153 to 471 bps at one-month horizon and
from 69 to 358 bps at annual horizon. These large excess returns are consistent with an average
positive term structure slope and with a period of declining interest rates. Panel (b) presents
estimates of the liquidity coe±cients. The results are conclusive. Estimates are negative and
signi¯cant at all horizons and maturities. Moreover, the impact of liquidity on excess returns is
economically signi¯cant. At a one-month horizon a one-standard deviation shock to our measure
of funding liquidity lowers expected excess returns obtained from o®-the-run bonds by 187 and
571 bps for maturities of two and ten years respectively. At this horizon, R2 statistics range
from 7.34% to 4.23% (see Panel (c)). Regressions based on excess returns at an annual horizon
correspond to the cased studied by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a) who document the substantial
predictability of US Treasury excess returns from forward rates. The impact of funding liquidity is
substantial. A one-standard deviation shock decreases expected excess returns by 103 basis points
at 2-year maturity and by as much as 358 basis points at 10-year maturity. At this horizon, R2 are
substantially higher, ranging from 43% and 50%. Of course, these coe±cients of variation pertain
to the joint explanatory power of all regressors. Panel (c) also presents, in bracket, the R2 of the
same regressions but excluding the liquidity factor. The liquidity factor accounts for more or less
half of the predictive power of the regressions.
The regressions above used excess returns and term structure factors computed from the term
structure model. One concern is that model misspeci¯cation leads to estimates of term structure
factors that do not correctly capture the information content of forward rates or that it induces
spurious correlations between excess returns and liquidity. As a robustness check against both
possibilities, we re-examine the predictability regressions but using excess returns and forward rates
available from the CRSP zero-coupon yield data set. From this alternative data set, we compute
annual excess returns on zero-coupon bonds with maturity from 2 to 5 years. As regressors, we
include annual forward rates from CRSP at horizon from 1 to 5 years along with the liquidity factor
from the model. Table VIa presents the results. Estimates of the liquidity coe±cients are very close
26Refcorp is an agency of the U.S. government. Its liabilities have their principals backed with U.S. Treasury bonds
and coupons explicitly guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury.
19to our previous results (see Table Vb) and highly signi¯cant. We conclude that the predictability
power of the liquidity factor is robust to how we compute excess returns and forward rates.
[Table VI about here.]
Furthermore, this alternative set of returns allows to check whether the AFENS model captures
important aspects of observed excess returns. Table VIb provides results for the regressions of
CRSP excess returns on CRSP forward rates, excluding the liquidity factor. This is a replication of
the unconstrained regressions in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005a) but for our shorter sample period.
This exercise con¯rms their stylized predictability results in this sample. That is, the predictive
power of forward rates is substantial and we recover a tent-shaped pattern of coe±cients across
maturities. Next, Table VIc provides results of a similar regressions with CRSP forward rates
but using excess returns computed from the model. Comparing the last two panels, we see that
average excess returns, forward rate coe±cients, as well as R2s are similar across data sets. This
is striking given that excess returns were recovered using very di®erent approaches. The AFENS
model captures the stylized facts of bond risk premia, which is an important measure of success for
term structure models.27
The evidence shows that variations of funding liquidity value induce variations in the liquidity
premium of Treasury bonds. Empirically, o®-the-run US Treasury bonds are viewed as liquid
substitutes to their recently issued counterparts and provide a hedge against °uctuations in funding
liquidity. Note that this link between conditions on the funding market and the risk premium on
a Treasury bond can hardly be attributed to traditional explanations of bond risk premia such as
in°ation risk or interest rate risk. Instead, we argue that frictions in the ¯nancial intermediation
sector a®ect the Treasury market. The following section considers the impact of funding liquidity
on LIBOR rates.
B LIBOR Loans
In this section, we link variations of the liquidity factor with variations in the risk compensation
from money market loans. We consider the returns obtained from rolling over a lending position in
the London inter-bank market at the LIBOR rate and funding this position at a ¯xed rate. This
measures the reward of providing liquidity in the inter-bank market. In contrast with the govern-
ment bond market, higher valuation of funding liquidity predicts higher excess returns. Figure 3b
highlights the positive correlation between liquidity and rolling excess returns. Again, note the
spikes in 1987, 1994, in 1998 and around the end of the millennium.
Thus, interbank loans are poor substitutes to U.S. Treasury securities in time of funding stress.
The reward for providing funds in the inter-bank market is higher when the relative value of on-
27Fama (1984b) originally identi¯ed this modeling challenge but see also Dai and Singleton (2002). Other stylized
facts are documented in Fama (1976), (1984a), and(1984b), as well as Startz (1982) for maturities below 1 year. See
also Shiller (1979), Fama and Bliss (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1991). Our conclusions hold if we use Campbell
and Shiller (1991) as a benchmark. We also conclude that the empirical facts highlighted by Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005a) are not an artefact of the bootstrap method. See the discussion in Dai et al. (2004) and Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2005b).
20the-run bonds increases. Thus, the spread of a LIBOR rate above the Treasury yield re°ects the
opportunity costs, in terms of future liquidity, of an interbank loan compared to the liquidity of
a Treasury bonds on the repo or the cash markets. Indeed, in order to convert a loan back to
cash, a bank must enter into a new bilateral contract to borrow money. The search costs of this
transaction depend on the number of willing counterparties in the market and it may be di±cult
at critical times to convert a LIBOR position back to cash.28
As in the previous section, we test this hypothesis formally through predictive regressions of
excess rolling returns on the liquidity factor. Again, we use term structure factors to control for
the information content of forward rates. We consider investment horizons of 1, 3, 6, 12 and 24
months and rolling investments in LIBOR loans with 1, 3, 6 and 12 months to maturity. The
LIBOR data is available from the web site of the BBA and we use a sample from January 1987 to
December 2007. Table VII presents the results. For each loan maturity, the average excess returns
is around 25 bps for the shortest horizon. Returns then decrease with longer horizon and become
negative at the longest horizons. This re°ects the average positive slope of the term structure. In
practice, funding rolling short-term investments at a ¯xed rate does not produce positive returns
on average. Still, the impact of liquidity is unambiguously positive for all horizons and maturities
with t-statistics above 5 in most cases.
Interestingly, the impact of the liquidity increases with the horizon. A one-standard deviation
shock to the value of liquidity increases returns on a rolling investment in one-month LIBOR loans
by 16 and 90 bps at horizons 3 and 24 months, respectively. Results are similar for other maturities.
In fact, the impact is su±ciently large that returns are positive on average, and the risk premium is
higher than the slope of the term structure. This re°ects the persistence of the liquidity premium.
The R2 from these regressions range from 30% to 50%. Moreover, the contribution of the liquidity
factor to the predictability of LIBOR returns is substantial, generally doubling the R2, or more. In
the case of annual excess rolling returns from 3-month loans, the predictive power increases from
10.8% to 43.2% when we include the liquidity factor.
An alternative indicator of ex-ante returns from investment in the inter-bank market is the sim-
ple spread of LIBOR rates above risk-free zero-coupon yields. As an alternative test, we compute
LIBOR spreads on loans with maturities of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months and consider regressions of these
spreads on the liquidity and term structure factors. Panel (c) shows the positive relationship be-
tween liquidity and the 12-month LIBOR spread. Table VIIIa presents results from the regressions.
A one-standard deviation shock to liquidity is associated with concurrent increases of 16, 12, 8 and
6 bps for loans with maturity of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months, respectively.
C Swap Spreads
The impact of funding liquidity extends to the swap market. This section documents the link
between the liquidity factor and the spread of swap rates above the o®-the-run curve. To the extent
28Note that this does not preclude that part of the LIBOR spread is due to the higher default risk of the average
issuer compared to the U.S. government.
21that swap rates are determined by anticipations of future LIBOR rates, results from the previous
section suggest that swap spreads increase with the liquidity factor. Moreover, variations in funding
liquidity may a®ect the swap market directly since the same intermediaries operate in the Treasury
and the swap markets. We do not distinguish between these alternative channels here.
[Table VIII about here.]
We obtain a sample of swap rates from DataStream, starting in April 1987 and up to December
2007. We focus on swaps with maturities of 2, 5, 7 and 10 years and compute their spreads above
the yield to maturity of the corresponding o®-the-run par coupon bond. Figure 3d compares the
liquidity factor with the 5-year swap spread. The positive relationship is apparent. Table VIIIb
shows the results from regressions of swap spreads on the liquidity and term structure factors.
First, the average spread rises with maturity, from 44 to 53 bps, and extends the pattern of LIBOR
risk premia. Next, estimates of the liquidity coe±cients imply that, controlling for term structure
factors, a one-standard deviation shock to liquidity raises swap spreads from 5 to 7 basis points
across maturities. The estimates are signi¯cant, both statically and economically, given the higher
price sensitivities of swap to change in yields. For a 5-year swap with duration of 4.5, say, the price
impact of a 6 basis point change is $0.27 while the price impact of the 6.3 bps rate change for a
1-year LIBOR loand is $0.063.29 Finally, the explanatory power of liquidity is high and increases
with maturity.
Interestingly, funding liquidity a®ects swap spreads and LIBOR spreads similarly. This suggests
that anticipations of liquidity compensation in the interbank loan market, rather than liquidity risk,
is the main driver behind the aggregate liquidity component of swap risk premium. This supports
previous literature (Grinblatt (2001), Du±e and Singleton (1997), Liu et al. (2006) and FedlhÄ utter
and Lando (2007)) pointing toward LIBOR liquidity premium as an important driver of swap
spreads. However, we show that the liquidity risk underlying a substantial part of that premium is
not speci¯c to the LIBOR market but re°ects risks faced by intermediaries in funding markets.
D Corporate Spreads
The impact of funding liquidity extends to the corporate bond market. This section measures
the impact of the liquidity factor on the risk premium o®ered by corporate bonds. Empirically, we
¯nd that the impact of liquidity has a \°ight-to-quality" pattern across credit ratings. Following
an increase of the liquidity factor, excess returns decrease for the higher ratings but increase for
the lower ratings. Our results are consistent with the evidence that default risk cannot rationalize
corporate spreads. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) ¯nd that most of the variations of non-default
corporate spreads are driven by a single latent factor. We formally link this factor with funding
risk. Our evidence is also consistent with the di®erential impact of liquidity across ratings found by
29We do not use returns on swap investment to measure expected returns. Swap investment requires zero initial
investment. Determining the proper capital-at-risk to use in returns computation is somewhat arbitrary. It should be
clear from Figure 3d that receiving ¯xed, and being exposed to short-term LIBOR °uctuations, will provide greater
compensation when the liquidity premium is elevated.
22Ericsson and Renault (2006). However, while they relate bond spreads to bond-speci¯c measures
of liquidity, we document the impact of an aggregate factor in the compensation for illiquidity.
Our analysis begins with Merrill Lynch corporate bond indices. We consider end-of-month data
from December 1988 to December 2007 on 5 indices with credit ratings of AAA, AA, A, BBB
and High Yield [HY] ratings (i.e. HY Master II index), respectively. In a complementary exercise,
below, we use a sample of NAIC transaction data.30 As in earlier sections, we measure the impact of
liquidity on corporate bonds through predictive excess returns regressions. For each index, and each
month, we compute returns in excess of the o®-the-run zero coupon yield for investment horizons
of 1, 3, 6, 12 and 24 months. We then project returns on the liquidity and term structure factors.
Again, term structure factors are included to control for the information content of the yield curve.
The ¯rst Panel of Table IX presents the results.
First, as expected, average excess returns are higher for lower ratings. Next, estimates of the
liquidity coe±cients show that the impact of a rising liquidity factor is negative for the higher
ratings and becomes positive for lower ratings. A one-standard deviation shock to the liquidity
factor leads to decreases in excess returns for AAA, AA and A ratings but to increases in excess
returns for BBB and HY ratings. Excess returns decrease by 2.27% for AAA index but increase
by 2.38% for the HY index. For comparison, the impact on Treasury bonds with 7 and 10 years to
maturity was -4.52% and -5.42%. Thus, on average, high quality bonds were considered substitutes,
albeit imperfect, to U.S. Treasuries as a hedge against variations in funding conditions. On the
other hand, lower-rated bonds were exposed to funding market shocks.
The di®erential impact of liquidity on excess returns across ratings suggests a °ight-to-liquidity
pattern. We consider an alternative sample, based on individual bond transaction data from the
NAIC. While this sample covers a shorter period, from February 1996 until December 2001, the sam-
ple comprises actual transaction data and provides a better coverage of the rating spectrum. Once
restricted to end-of-month observations, the sample includes 2,171 transactions over 71 months. To
preserve parsimony, we group ratings in ¯ve categories.31 We consider regression of NAIC corporate
spreads on the liquidity and term structure factors but we also include the control variables used
by Ericsson and Renault (2006). These are the VIX index, the returns on the S&P500 index, a
measure of market-wide default risk premium and an on-the-run dummy signalling whether that
particular bond was on-the-run at the time of the transaction. Control variables also include the
level and the slope of the term structure of interest rates.32.
The panel regressions of credit spreads for bond i at date t are given by
sprdi;t = ® + ¯1LtI(Gi = 1) + ¢¢¢ + ¯5LtI(Gi = 5) + °T
h Xt + ²i;t (26)
30We thank Jan Ericsson for providing the NAIC transaction data and control variables. See Ericsson and Renault
(2006) for a discussion of this data set.
31Group 1 includes ratings from AAA to A+, group 2 includes ratings A and A-, group 3 includes ratings BBB+,
BBB and BBB-, group 4 includes ratings CCC+, CCC and CCC- while group 5 includes the remaining ratings down
to C-
32We do not include individual bond ¯xed-e®ects as our sample is small relative to the number (998) of securities.
23where Lt is the liquidity factor and I(Gi = j) is an indicator function equal to one if the credit
rating of bond i belongs in group j = 1;:::;5. Control variables are grouped in the vector Xt+h.
Table IXb presents the results. The °ight-to-quality pattern clearly emerges from the results. For
the highest rating category, an increase in liquidity value of one standard deviation decreases spreads
by 31 and 20 basis points in groups 1 and 2 respectively. The e®ect is smaller and statistically
undistinguishable from zero for group 3. Coe±cients then become positive implying increases in
spreads of 25 and 26 basis points for groups 4 and 5, respectively. This is an average e®ect through
time and across ratings within each group.33
The results obtained from spreads computed from Merrill Lynch indices and spreads computed
from NAIC transactions di®er. While results from Merrill Lynch were inconclusive, estimates of
liquidity coe±cients obtained from NAIC data con¯rm that a shock to funding liquidity leads to
lower corporate spreads in the highest rating groups but higher corporate spreads in the lowest
rating groups. Two important di®erences between samples may explain the results. First, the
composition of the index is di®erent from the composition of NAIC transaction data. The impact
of liquidity on corporate spreads may not be homogenous across issues. For example, the maturity
or the age of a bond, the industry of the issuer and security-speci¯c option features may introduce
heterogeneity. Second, Merrill Lynch indices cover a much longer time span. The pattern of
liquidity premia across the quality spectrum may be time-varying.
E Discussion
Focusing on the common component of on-the-run premia ¯lters out local or idiosyncratic
demand and supply e®ects on Treasury bond prices. The results above show that this measure of
funding liquidity is an aggregate risk factor a®ecting money market instruments and ¯xed-income
securities. These assets carry a signi¯cant, time-varying and common liquidity premium. That is,
when the value of the most-easily funded collateral rises relative to other securities, we observe
variations in risk premia for o®-the-run U.S. government bonds, eurodollar loans, swap contracts,
and corporate bonds. Empirically, the impact of aggregate liquidity on asset pricing appears
strongly during crisis and the pattern is suggestive of a °ight-to-quality behavior. Nevertheless, its
impact is pervasive even in normal times.
Note that these regressions assumed a stable relationship between risk premium and funding
liquidity. One important alternative is that the sign and the size of the impact of funding conditions
itself depend on the intensity of the funding shock, as suggested by the recent experience. In
particular, while corporate bonds with high ratings may be substitutes to Treasury bonds in good
times, they experience large risk premium increases in funding crisis. We leave this for further
research but note that this may explain the weak statistical evidence above in the case of corporate
bonds. In any case, the main result of this section is that a substantial fraction of the risk premia
is linked to variations in funding liquidity.
33We do not report other coe±cients. Brie°y, the coe±cient on the level factor is negative and signi¯cant. All
other coe±cients are insigni¯cant but these results are are not directly comparable with Ericsson and Renault (2006)
due to di®erences of models and sample frequencies.
24Jointly, the evidence is hard to reconcile with theories based on variations of default probability,
in°ation or interest rates and their associated risk premia. Instead, we link risk premium variations
with conditions in the funding markets. This supports the theoretical literature that emphasizes
the role of borrowing constraints faced by ¯nancial intermediaries (Gromb and Vayanos (2002),
He and Krishnamurthy (2007)) and, in particular, that highlights the role of funding markets in
¯nancial intermediation (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008)). Di®erent securities serve, in part,
and to varying degrees, to ful¯ll investors' uncertain future needs for cash and their risk premium
depend on the ability of intermediaries to provide immediacy in each market. In this context, it
is interesting that the liquidity premium of government bonds appears to decrease when funding
liquidity become scarce. This confers a special status to government obligations, and possibly
to high-quality corporate bonds, as a hedge against variations in funding liquidity. We leave for
further research the cause of this special attribute of government bonds. The next section identi¯es
candidate determinants of liquidity valuation and characterizes aggregate liquidity in terms of
known economic indicators.
VI Determinants Of Liquidity Value
The liquidity factor aggregates very diverse economic information. The value of liquidity services on
the funding market depends on investors' demand for immediacy on markets where intermediaries
are active. Next, funding costs will also vary with the capital position and the access to capital
(present and future) of ¯nancial intermediaries that obtain leverage through secured loans. Finally,
conditions on the funding market are a®ected by the availability of funds and, thus, by the relative
tightness of monetary policy. In this section, we ¯nd that the value of funding liquidity, measured
by the on-the-run factor, varies with changes in monetary aggregates and in bank reserves. Also, the
value of funding liquidity increases with aggregate wealth and aggregate uncertainty as measured
by valuation ratios and option-implied volatility of the SP500 stock index. Finally, the on-the-run
premium rises when recently issued bonds o®ers relatively lower bid-ask spreads34.
A Macroeconomic Variables
Ludvigson and Ng (2009) [LN hereafter] summarize 132 US macroeconomic series into 8 princi-
pal components. They then explore parsimoniously the predictive content of this large information
set for bond returns. Their main result is that that a \real" and an \in°ation" factor35 have sub-
stantial predictive power for bond excess returns beyond the information content of forward rates.
They also ¯nd that a \¯nancial" factor is signi¯cant but that much of its information content is
subsumed in the Cochrane-Piazzesi measure of bond risk premium.
Table X displays results from a regression of liquidity on macroeconomic factors (Regression A)
34We also considered the Pastor-Stambaugh measure of aggregate stock market liquidity and found no relationship.
35Ludvigson and Ng (2009) use univariate regressions of individual series on each principal component to charac-
terize its information content. For example, the \real" factor was labeled as such because it has high explanatory
power for real quantities (e.g. Industrial Production).
25from LN.36 This shows that the funding liquidity factor shares tight linkages with the macroecon-
omy. Macroeconomic factors with signi¯cant coe±cients are F1, F2 and F4, the \real", \¯nancial"
and \in°ation" factors of LN that also predict bond risk premium. In addition, factors F5, F6,
and F7 are also signi¯cant. As we discuss below, F6, and F7 can be interpreted as \monetary
conditions" factors and F5 is a \housing activity" factor. Finally, the R2 is 58% and individual
coe±cients have similar magnitude.
[Table X about here.]
The \¯nancial" factor relates to di®erent interest rate spreads, which is consistent with the
evidence above that the liquidity factor is related to risk premia across markets.37 The F6 and F7
factors share a similar and extremely interesting interpretation: these are \monetary conditions"
factors. Both have highest explanatory power for the rate of change in reserves and non-borrowed
reserves of depository institutions. Next, factor F6 has most information for the rate of change of
the monetary base and the M1 measure of money stock and some information from the PCE indices.
Beyond bank reserves, factor F7 is most informative for the spreads of commercial paper and three-
month Treasury bills above the Federal Reserve funds rate. This suggests an important channel
between monetary policy and the intermediation mechanism and, ultimately, with variations in
the valuation of marketwide liquidity. These results are consistent with Longsta® (2004), who
establishes a link between variations of RefCorp spreads and measures of °ows into money market
mutual funds, Longsta® et al. (2005), who document a similar link for the non-default component of
corporate spreads and, ¯nally, Chordia et al. (2005), who document that money °ows and monetary
surprises a®ect measures of bond market liquidity.
We ¯nd that the liquidity factor is also related to the \real", \in°ation" factors, indicating that
some of the predictability of macro factors for bond risk premium could be measured in funding
markets. This may also result from the impact of the Fed's actions on funding markets. The F5
is a \housing activity" factor and is also signi¯cant. It contains information on housing starts and
new building permits. Nonetheless, its signi¯cance appears to be limited to the early part of the
sample and it is not robust to the inclusion of bid-ask spreads information (see below). Finally, the
\real" and \in°ation" factors are not robust to the inclusion of stock index implied volatility.
B Transaction Costs Variables
Coupon bond quotes from the CRSP data set include bid and ask prices. At each point in time,
we consider the entire cross-section of bonds and compute the di®erence between the median and
the minimum bid-ask spreads. This measures the di®erence in transaction costs between the most
liquid bond and a typical bond. Table X presents the results from a regression of liquidity on this
36A signi¯cant link between liquidity and one of the principal components of LN does not necessarily require that
this component predicts bond excess returns. The liquidity factor is endogenous and its loadings on the underlying
macroeconomic variables is unlikely to be linear nor constant through time.
37LN found that the information content of the \¯nancial" factor for excess returns is subsumed in the CP factor.
Recall from Section A that the information content of the funding liquidity factor is not subsumed by the Cochrane-
Piazzesi factor.
26measure of relative transaction costs. The coe±cient is positive and signi¯cant. The liquidity factor
increases when the median bid-ask spread moves further away from the minimum spread. That
is, on-the-run bonds become more expensive when they o®er relatively lower transaction costs.
The explanatory power of bid-ask information is substantial, as measured by an R2 of 37.7%.
However, there is a sharp structural break in this relationship. Most of the explanatory power and
all of the statistical evidence is driven by observations preceding 1990 as made clear by Figure 7a.
The ¯rst break in this process coincides with the advent of the GovPX platform while the second
break, around 1999, matches the introduction of the eSpeed electronic trading platform. Although
transaction costs contribute to the on-the-run premium, the lack of variability since these breaks
implies a lesser role in the variations of liquidity on Treasury markets.
C Aggregate Uncertainty
The valuation of liquidity should increase with higher aggregate uncertainty. We use implied
volatility from options on the S&P 500 stock index as proxy for aggregate uncertainty. The S&P500
index comprises a large share of aggregate wealth and its implied volatility can be interpreted as
a forward looking indicator of wealth volatility. The sample comprises monthly observations of
the CBOE VOX index from January 1986 until the end of 2007. Table X presents results from a
regression of liquidity on aggregate uncertainty (Regression C). The R2 is 7.9% and the coe±cients
is positive but the evidence is statistically weak. Figure 7b shows the measures of volatility and
funding liquidity until the end of 2008. Clearly, peaks in volatility are often associated with rises
in liquidity valuation. The weak statistical evidence is due to the period around 2002 where very
low funding liquidity value was not matched with a proportional decrease of implied volatility. In
any case, the coe±cient estimate suggests that a one-standard deviation shock to implied volatility
raises the liquidity factor by 0:052.
D Combining Regressors
Finally, Table X reports the results from a regression combining all the economic information
considered above (Regression D). The coe±cient on the relative bid-ask spread decreases but re-
mains signi¯cant. On the other hand, the information from the VIX measure is subsumed in other
regressors. Its coe±cient changes sign and becomes insigni¯cant. In particular, the VIX measure is
positively correlated with the stock market factor and this factor's coe±cient doubles. Next, the in-
°ation, real and housing activity factor become insigni¯cant. However, the \monetary conditions"
factors also remain signi¯cant when conditioning on transaction costs and aggregate uncertainty
information.
Overall the evidence points toward two broad channels in the determination of the value of
funding liquidity. First, similar to the model of Krishnamurthy and He (2008), aggregate uncer-
tainty and aggregate wealth a®ect the intermediaries' ability to provide liquidity. Second, the Fed
implements its monetary policy primarily through the funding market. To some extent, it also
support to the stability of the ¯nancial system through that channel. Then, these policies, through
their impact on funding conditions directly impact risk premium in other markets.
27VII The Events Of 2008
We repeat the estimation of the model including data from 2008. Figure 7 presents the liquidity
(Panel 8a) and the term structure (Panel 8b)factors. The latter shows a sharp increase in the
cross-section of on-the-run premium. In fact, this large shock increases the volatility of the liquidity
factor substantially. Looking at Figure 7b and 7a we see that this spike was associated with a large
increase in the SP500 implied volatility but, interestingly, the spread between the minimum and
median bid-ask spread remained stable. This supports our interpretation that the liquidity factor
¯nds its roots in the funding market.
Adding 2008 only increases the measured impact of the common funding liquidity factor on
bond risk premia. Each of the regression above leads to higher estimate for the liquidity coe±cient.
An interesting case, though, is the behavior of corporate bond spreads. Clearly corporate bond
spreads increased sharply over that period, indicating an increase in expected returns. What is
interesting is that this was the case for any ratings. Figure 8 compares the liquidity factor with
the spread of the AAA and BBB Merrill Lynch index. In the sample excluding 2008, the estimated
average impact a shock to funding liquidity was negative for AAA bonds and positive for BBB. The
large and positively correlated shock in 2008 reverses this conclusion for AAA bonds. But note that
AAA spreads and the liquidity factor were also positively correlated in 1998. This con¯rms our
conjecture that the behavior of high-rating bonds is not stable and depends on the nature or the
size of the shock to funding liquidity. Note that this does not a®ect our conclusion that corporate
bond liquidity premium shares a component with other risk premium due to funding risk. Instead,
it suggests that the relationship exhibits regimes through time.
VIII Conclusion
We augment the Arbitrage Free Extended Nelson-Siegel term structure model of Christensen et al.
(2007) by allowing for a liquidity factor driving the on-the-run premium. Estimation of the model
proceeds directly from coupon bond prices using a non-linear ¯lter. We identify from a panel of
Treasury bonds a common liquidity factor driving on-the-run premia at di®erent maturities. Its
e®ect increases with maturity and decreases with the age of a bond.
This liquidity factors measures the value of the lower funding and transaction costs of on-the-
run bonds. It predicts a substantial share of the risk premium on o®-the-run bonds. It also predicts
LIBOR spreads, swap spreads and corporate bond spreads. The pattern across interest rate markets
and credit ratings is consistent with accounts of °ight-to-liquidity events. However, the e®ect is
pervasive in normal times. The evidence points toward the importance of funding liquidity for the
intermediation mechanism and, hence, for asset pricing. Our results are robust to changes in data
set and to the inclusion of term structure information.
The liquidity factor varies with transaction costs on the secondary bond market. More impor-
tantly, we ¯nd that the value of liquidity is related to narrow measures monetary aggregates and
28measures of bank reserves. It also varies with measures of stock market valuations and aggregate
uncertainty. The ability of intermediaries to meet the demand for immediacy depends, in part, on
funding conditions and induces a large common liquidity premium in key interest rate markets. In
particular, our results suggest that the behavior of the Fed is a key determinants of the liquidity
premium. It remains to be seen if the impact of aggregate liquidity extends to the risk premium
for stocks. In this context, the measure of funding liquidity proposed here can be used as real-time
measure of liquidity premia.
29IX Appendix
A Data
We use end-of-month prices of U.S. Treasury securities from the CRSP data set. We exclude
callable bonds, °ower bonds and other bonds with tax privileges, issues with no publicly outstanding
securities, bonds and bills with less than 2 months to maturity and observations with either bid or
ask prices missing. Our sample covers the period from January 1986 to December 2008. We also
exclude the following suspicious quotes.
CRSP ID Date
#19920815.107250 August 31st 1987
#19950331.203870 December 30th
#19980528.400000 May 30th 1998
#20011130.205870 October 31th
#20041031.202120 November 29th 2002
#20070731.203870 May 31st 2006
#20080531.204870 November 30th 2007
CRSP ID #20040304.400000 has a maturity date preceding its issuance date, as dated by the
U.S. Treasury. Finally, CRSP ID #20130815.204250 is never special and is excluded.
B Unscented Kalman Filter
The UKF is based on an approximation to any non-linear transformation of a probability
distribution. It has been introduced in Julier et al. (1995) and Julier and Uhlmann (1996) (see
Wan and der Merwe (2001) for textbook treatment) and was ¯rst imported in ¯nance by Leippold
and Wu (2003).
Given ^ Xt+1jt a time-t forecast of state variable for period t + 1, and its associated MSE ^ Qt+1jt
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is the i-th row or column of the matrix square root. Julier and Uhlmann
(1996) use a Taylor expansion to evaluate the approximation's accuracy. The expansion of y = g(x)
around ¹ x is
¹ y = E [g(¹ x + ¢x)]













¢x(g) operator evaluates the total di®erential of g(¢) when perturbed by ¢x, and





















Di®erent approximation strategies for ¹ y will di®er by either the number of terms used in the
expansion or the set of perturbations ¢x. If the distribution of ¢x is symmetric, all odd-ordered
terms are zero. Moreover, we can re-write the second terms as a function of the covariance matrix
Pxx of ¢x,











Linearisation leads to the approximation ^ ¹ ylin = g(¹ x) while the unscented approximation is exact
up to the third-order term and the ¾-points have the correct covariance matrix by construction.
In the Gaussian case, Julier and Ulhmann (1996) show that same-variable fourth moments agree
as well and that all other moments are lower than the true moments of ¢x. Then, approximation
errors of higher order terms are necessarily smaller for the UKF than for the EKF. Using a similar
argument, but for approximation of the MSE, Julier and Uhlmann (1996) show that linearisation
and the unscented transformation agree with the Taylor expansion up to the second-order term
and that approximation errors in higher-order terms are smaller for the UKF.
C Arbitrage-Free Yield Adjustment Term
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37Table II: Parameter estimates of transition equations.
Panel (a) presents estimation results for the AFENS model without liquidity. Panel (b) presents estimation results
for the AFENS model with liquidity. For each parameter, the ¯rst standard error (in parenthesis) is computed from
the QMLE covariance matrix (see Equation 23) while the second is computed from the outer product of scores (see
Equation 25). End-of-month data from CRSP (1985:12-2007:12).
(a)
¹ F K § (£10
2)
0.0545 0.169 0.68
Level (0.0136) (0.177) (0.42)
(0.0093) (0.069) (0.03)
-0.0172 0.182 0.76 0.84
Slope (0.0277) (0.088) (0.75) (0.46)
(0.013) (0.071) (0.06) (0.04)
-0.0128 0.891 -0.14 0.41 2.31
Curvature (0.0061) (0.860) (1.86) (1.64) (0.66)
(0.0045) (0.283) (0.15) (0.17) (0.13)
(b)
¹ F K § (£10
2)
0.0576 0.198 0.85
Level (0.0165) (0.165) (0.86)
(0.0154) (0.098) (0.02)
-0.0167 0.222 -0.81 0.85
Slope (0.0092) (0.293) (0.85) (0.44)
(0.0165) (0.145) (0.06) (0.05)
-0.0189 0.887 0.57 0.25 2.27
Curvature (0.0057) (1.414) (0.82) (1.91) (1.66)
(0.0088) (0.325) (0.13) (0.20) (0.12)
¹ L Ál ¾l
0.32 0.955 0.06
Liquidity (0.42) (0.034) (0.066)
(0.09) (0.021) (0.011)
38Table III: Mean Pricing Errors and Root Mean Squared Pricing Errors
Panel (a) presents MPE and Panel (b) presents RMSPE from AFENS models with and without liquidity. The
columns correspond to liquidity category where New refers to on-the-run issues and Old refers to o®-the-run issues.
End-of-month data from CRSP (1985:12-2007:12).
(a) Mean Pricing Errors
Mean Pricing Errors
Benchmark Model Liquidity Model
Maturity Old New Old New
3 0.009 0.032 -0.010 0.001
6 -0.003 0.022 0.009 -0.011
9 -0.035 0.024 -0.008 0.016
12 -0.043 0.035 -0.015 0.029
18 -0.057 -0.054 -0.010 -0.004
24 -0.022 0.000 0.007 4e
¡5
36 0.001 0.068 -0.020 0.013
48 -0.002 0.082 -0.060 0.018
60 -0.010 0.177 0.021 0.034
84 -0.080 0.014 0.024 -0.021
120 -0.402 0.249 -0.075 0.104
All -0.058 0.059 -0.011 0.016
(b) Root Mean Squared Errors
Root Mean Squared Pricing Errors
Benchmark Model Liquidity Model
Maturity Old New Old New
3 0.048 0.060 0.037 0.031
6 0.036 0.046 0.033 0.030
9 0.055 0.060 0.039 0.054
12 0.076 0.081 0.052 0.073
18 0.091 0.088 0.048 0.048
24 0.069 0.094 0.053 0.082
36 0.105 0.138 0.103 0.109
48 0.199 0.200 0.184 0.134
60 0.234 0.271 0.231 0.179
84 0.363 0.301 0.276 0.238
120 0.710 0.500 0.290 0.413
All 0.264 0.216 0.157 0.167
39Table IV: On-the-run Premium
Each line corresponds to a maturity category (months). The ¯rst two columns provide the average of residual
di®erences in each category for the AFENS model with and without maturity, respectively. The last three columns
display estimates of the liquidity level, ^ ¯, followed by standard errors (in parenthesis). The ¯rst standard error is
computed from the QMLE covariance matrix (see Equation 23) while the second is computed from the outer product
of scores. (see Equation 24). End-of-month data from CRSP (1985:12-2008:12).
Maturity Redidual Di®erences ^ ¯ Standard Error
Benchmark Liquidity QMLE MLE
3 0.0111 -0.0053 0.2642 0.030411409 0.023289472
6 0.0221 -0.0295 0.2837 0.032610756 0.027397712
9 0.0566 0.0202 0.3158 0.03709391 0.033157944
12 0.0783 0.0396 0.3026 0.036220666 0.033527915
18 0.0025 -0.0036 0.0428 0.024812485 0.035277936
24 0.028 -0.0117 0.2005 0.032073934 0.035007491
36 0.0644 -0.026 0.5325 0.073912661 0.084293764
48 0.0892 0.0165 0.7446 0.094527023 0.088060245
60 0.2477 0.0102 1.227 0.136949189 0.119759631
84 0.125 -0.0509 1.2174 0.102685574 0.097803022















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































41Table VI: O®-the-run excess returns and funding liquidity











t+h is the annual excess returns on a bond with maturity m (years), Lt is the liquidity factor and ft is
a vector of annual forward rates f
(h)
t from 1 to 5 years. Regressors are demeaned and divided by their standard
deviations. Panel (a) presents results using returns and forward rates directly from CRSP data but with the liquidity
factor from the model. Panel (b) excludes the liquidity factor. Panel (c) excludes the liquidity factor and uses excess
returns from the model. Newey-West t-statistics (in parenthesis) with 15 lags. End-of-month data from CRSP
(1985:12-2007:12).













2 0.72 0.29 -1.31 1.88 0.93 -0.95 -0.78 41.65
(3.49) (0.49) (-1.18) (1.50) (1.04) (-1.60) (-5.97)
3 1.31 0.15 -2.26 4.32 0.76 -1.49 -1.55 41.66
(3.41) (0.14) (-1.13) (1.89) (0.48) (-1.27) (-5.93)
4 1.79 -0.51 -1.74 4.58 1.53 -1.85 -2.18 42.82
(3.53) (-0.35) (-0.66) (1.51) (0.75) (-1.13) (-6.07)
5 1.98 -1.51 -0.24 4.57 0.36 -0.81 -2.66 40.87
(3.23) (-0.84) (-0.07) (1.24) (0.15) (-0.39) (-5.83)













2 0.72 -0.43 -1.34 2.66 0.99 -1.53 21.04
(2.95) (-0.57) (-1.06) (1.50) (0.95) (-2.13)
3 1.31 -1.27 -2.33 5.86 0.88 -2.64 19.29
(2.87) (-0.87) (-1.04) (1.77) (0.46) (-1.86)
4 1.79 -2.52 -1.83 6.74 1.70 -3.46 19.86
(2.95) (-1.26) (-0.62) (1.51) (0.67) (-1.76)
5 1.98 -3.96 -0.35 7.20 0.56 -2.79 18.27
(2.71) (-1.65) (-0.10) (1.35) (0.19) (-1.14)













2 0.66 -0.13 -1.91 2.97 0.93 -1.51 21.10
(2.71) (-0.17) (-1.53) (1.69) (0.91) (-2.09)
3 1.27 -1.15 -2.04 4.97 1.19 -2.43 18.19
(2.82) (-0.79) (-0.90) (1.50) (0.63) (-1.73)
4 1.74 -2.46 -1.26 6.09 1.18 -2.92 17.22
(2.83) (-1.24) (-0.41) (1.34) (0.46) (-1.47)
5 2.09 -3.86 0.00 6.62 1.06 -3.12 17.15


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































46Figure 1: Liquidity and Term structure factors
Factors from the AFENS model with liquidity. Panel (a) displays the liquidity factor. The scale is
in dollar. Panel (b) displays the term structure factors. The scale is in percentage. End-of-month
data from CRSP (1985:12-2007:12).

























(b) Term Structure Factors
47Figure 2: Excess returns and funding liquidity
The liquidity factor and the risk premium in di®erent markets. Panel (a) displays annual excess
returns on 2-year o®-the-run U.S. Treasury bonds. Panel (b) displays annual excess rolling returns
on a 12-month LIBOR loan. Panel (d) displays the spread of the 1-year LIBOR rate above the
o®-the-run 1-year zero yield. Panel (d) displays the spread of the 5-year swap rate. Excess returns
are computed above the o®-the-run Treasury risk-free rate. End-of-month data from CRSP
(1985:12-2007:12).
















(a) O®-the-run excess returns











Libor Excess Rolling Returns
(b) LIBOR excess rolling returns















Libor − Treasuries (12 months)
(c) 1-year LIBOR spread














(d) 5-year swap spread
48Figure 3: Corporate spread and funding liquidity
The liquidity factor with corporate bond spreads for di®erent ratings. Panel (a) compares with
the spreads of Merrill Lynch indices for high quality bonds: AAA, AA and A ratings. Panel (b)
compares with the spread of Merrill Lynch BBB and High Yield corporate bond indices. Spreads
are computed above the o®-the-run 10-year Treasury par yield.












(a) Liquidity and Merrill Lynch AAA, AA, and A indices

















(b) Liquidity and Merrill Lynch BBB and High Yield indices
49Figure 4: Residual Di®erences - Benchmark Model
Comparison of residual di®erences and ages for the benchmark AFENS model without liquidity.
Panel (a) presents di®erences between the residuals (dollars) of the on-the-run and o®-the-run
bonds in the 12-month category. Panel (b) presents the residuals 48-month category. Panel (c)
and (d) displays years from issuance for the more recent and the seasoned bonds in the 12-month
and the 48-month category, respectively. End-of-month data from CRSP (1985:12-2007:12).










(a) 12-month residual di®erence










(b) 48-month residual di®erence




















50Figure 5: Residual di®erences - Liquidity Model
Comparison of residual di®erences for the AFENS model with liquidity. Panel (a) present di®er-
ences between residuals (dollars) of on-the-run and o®-the-run bonds in the 12-month category.
Panel (b) presents di®erences between residuals (dollars) in the 48-month category. End-of-month
data from CRSP (1985:12-2007:12).










(a) 12-month residual di®erences








(b) 48-month residual di®erences
51Figure 6: Determinants of Liquidity
Panel (a) traces the liquidity factor and the di®erence between the median and the minimum
bid-ask spread at each observation date. Panel (b) traces the liquidity factor and implied volatility
from S&P 500 call options. The liquidity factor is obtained from the AFENS model with liquidity.
End-of-month data from CRSP (1985:12-2008:12)















(a) Bid-Ask Spread and Liquidity















(b) Volatility and Liquidity
52Figure 7: Liquidity and Term structure factors including 2008 Data
Factors from the AFENS model with liquidity. Panel (a) displays the liquidity factor. The scale is
in dollar. Panel (b) displays the term structure factors. The scale is in percentage. End-of-month
data from CRSP (1985:12-2008:12).

























(b) Term Structure Factors
53Figure 8: Corporate spread and funding liquidity including 2008 data
The liquidity factor with corporate bond spreads for di®erent ratings. Panel (a) compares with
the spreads of Merrill Lynch index for AAA bonds. Panel (b) compares with the spread of Merrill
BBB corporate bond index. Spreads are computed above the o®-the-run 10-year Treasury par
yield. End-of-month data from CRSP and Merrill Lynch (1988:12-2008:12).














(a) Liquidity and Merrill Lynch AAA indiex














(b) Liquidity and Merrill Lynch BBB index
54